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I. INTRODUCTION
As the old saying goes, the only two things certain in life are
death and taxes. But individuals can never be certain about the tax
consequences that accompany death. The desire to reduce tax
liability upon death and subsequently increase the value of assets
transferred to surviving family members leads many people to
actively manage their estates. Active management reduces the
uncertainty associated with the taxes levied on a decedent's estate.
There are several useful methods available to reduce estate tax
liability, including the family limited partnership. Individuals
transfer assets to the family limited partnership in exchange for
interest in the partnership.' The value, and resulting tax liability,
for the partnership interest is generally lower than the aggregate
value of the assets valued separately because the IRS permits the
application of discounts to business interests to reflect lack of
control, illiquidity, and lack of marketability. 2 Maximizing the
amount of discounts applied to assets in the estate is a major goal
of estate plans.3 Although death and taxes are certainties, discounts
can be used to decrease the tax consequences of death.
The value of these partnership interests is largely dependant on
the rights held by the owner under state law.4 Louisiana
partnership law states that a partner ceases to be a member of the
partnership at death, and at death, the partner's successors are
entitled to the value of his former share.5 State courts have
determined the appropriate method for assigning value to the
shares. Prior to the recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision in
Cannon v. Bertrand,6 the court determined that fair market value
Copyright 2011, by JONATHAN J. ROSE.
1. Russell Standaland, Note, Valuation Discounts After Estate of Nowell v.
Commissioner: A Clear Formula for Reducing Estate Taxes, 30 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 679, 684-85 (2000).
2. Louis A. MEZZULLO, BNA TAX & ACCOUNTING CTR., PORTFOLIO 722-
3RD: FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES pt.
I.C (2011).
3. Id.
4. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
5. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2823 (2005).
6. 2 So. 3d 393 (La. 2009).
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was the proper valuation method.7 Under this method, family
estate plans were still able to utilize the partnership as a means of
achieving value-reducing discounts. The Cannon court, however,
deviated from the manner in which partnerships were valued in
prior partnership valuation cases.8 The type of valuation used by
the court in Cannon increases the potential judicial award for the
interest of a withdrawing partner. This decision is also likely to
increase the value of a deceased partner's former interest for estate
tax purposes.' 0 The potential increase in value of partnership
interests makes the family limited partnership a less attractive
option for estate planning.
The limited liability company (LLC) is a more effective estate
tax planning tool post-Cannon. 2 Although the extent to which
Cannon will affect future partnership valuation is uncertain, the
probable 3result is a higher valuation placed on partnership
interests. However, the law on LLC interest valuation after death
is different from the law for standard partnerships.14 This
difference makes the Cannon decision inapplicable to LLC
valuation upon death, meaning Louisiana LLC interests will still be
eligible for the valuation discounts that are desirable in estate
planning. The uncertainty surrounding partnership valuation post-
Cannon can be avoided through the use of LLCs in estate planning.
Part I of this Note discusses relevant partnership withdrawal
law and the judicially crafted valuation method that existed prior to
the Cannon decision, as well as relevant estate tax law. Part II
presents and analyzes the Cannon decision. Part III explains the
effects of state law on estate tax and examines the effects of
Cannon on the valuation of partnership interests for estate tax
purposes. Part IV discusses the family limited partnership and
presents the limited liability company as a more effective estate
planning alternative post-Cannon.
7. Shopf v. Marina Del Ray P'ship, 549 So. 2d 833, 839 (La. 1989).
8. See discussion infra Part II.B.
9. See discussion infra Part III.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
11. See discussion infra Part V.A.
12. See discussion infra Part V.B.
13. See discussion infra Part III.
14. See discussion infra Part V.B.
II. PARTNERSHIP AND ESTATE TAx BACKGROUND
A. Partnership Withdrawal Under the Civil Code
The withdrawal rights of a partner under Louisiana law depend
on whether the partnership is constituted for a term."s If the
partnership is constituted for a term, a partner may withdraw
before the expiration of the term only if he has just cause arising
out of the failure of another partner to fulfill an obligation.16 If the
partnership is constituted without a term, a partner may withdraw
at any time with reasonable notice, as long as the time is not
unfavorable to the partnership.' 7 The Civil Code articles suggest
that withdrawal is generally permitted in a non-term partnership
and not permitted in a partnership constituted for a term.
Louisiana Civil Code article 2823 states that a withdrawing
partner, or his successors if the partner is deceased, is entitled to an
amount equal to the value of the former partner's share at the time
membership ceased.' 9 The parties can stipulate the value of the
former partner's share in the partnership agreement or in a separate
agreement. 20 If no agreement on the value of the former partner's
share is reached, any party can seek audicial determination of the
value and an order for its payment. Although the Civil Code
provides a judicial remedy for a withdrawing partner seeking the
value of his share, it does not give guidance as to how this value
should be determined.22
B. Valuation Standard Prior to Cannon v. Bertrand
The Louisiana Supreme Court first considered the issue of
valuing a withdrawing partner's share in a partnership in Shopf v.
Marina Del Ray Partnership.23 The case involved a partner who
was brought into a partnership as the general manager of a marina
15. Susan E. Acklin, Valuation of Closely Held Business Interests: Chapter
14's Special Valuation Rules and Its Effects on Louisiana Partnership and
Louisiana Limited Liability Company Law, 41 LOY. L. REV. 329, 347 (1995).
16. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2821 (2005).
17. Id. art. 2822.
18. GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
§ 4.07, in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 136 (1999).
19. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2823.
20. Id. cmt. (a).
21. Id. art. 2825.
22. MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 18, § 4.11, at 157.
23. 549 So. 2d 833 (La. 1989).
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that was under development.24 However, the land for the marina
was never developed, and the new partner was soon fired as
general manager.2 Thereafter, the plaintiff withdrew from the
partnership and sought to receive the value of his share from the
remaining partners because the partnership agreement contained no
provision for determining value. 26 However, the majority partner
refused to pay anything for the share, even though he had made an
offer to purchase the plaintiffs share prior to his firing.27 The
former partner sued to recover the value of his share of the
partnership when no agreement was reached.28
The court determined in Shopf that the proper method for
valuing a withdrawing partner's interest was the fair market value
approach. 29 The court defined fair market value as "the price that a
willing buyer would pay to a willing seller for a certain piece of
property in an arm's length transaction, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge
of the relevant facts."30 In order to determine fair market value in
Shopf the court relied on evidence of the offer by the majority
partner to buy the plaintiffs share. 3 1 This offer was the most
significant factor in determining the value of the share because
both parties were knowledgeable participants in the transaction.
However, the offer did not represent the value that would be paid
in an arm's length transaction because of both parties' involvement
in the business. The majority owner had a greater interest in the
share than a third party because it would increase his percentage of
ownership in the partnership. The court took this into account and
adjusted the offer to determine fair market value in a true arm's
length transaction. 34
The court further adjusted the majority partner's offer by
applying a minority discount because "the plaintiffs share [was] a
minority interest in a closely held business."35 The rationale behind
a minority discount is that although a minority interest may be
24. Id. at 834-35.
25. Id. at 835-36.
26. Id. at 836.
27. Id. at 835-36.
28. Id. at 836.
29. Id. at 839.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id
34. Id. at 840.
35. Id.
[Vol. 711032
uniquely valuable to the owner, it has less value to a third party in
an arm's length transaction because of the minority owner's
inability to control the distributions and policies of the business.36
A minority interest is also more difficult to market because the
lack of control makes it a less desirable investment, and therefore
discounts for lack of marketability are also appropriate. 3 7 Based on
these principles, the court considered the minority status of the
share-and its subsequent lack of marketability-in discounting
the plaintiffs interest in the partnership to reach fair market
value.38
Shopf established the fair market value approach, which
utilizes discounts, as the proper standard to value a minority share
in a closely held business in Louisiana.39 As the controlling case on
the issue, lower courts followed the Shopf approach prior to the
Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Cannon. 4 0 The fair market
value standard used in Shopf was consistent with the valuation
method used for estate tax purposes.41
C. Estate Tax Provisions
The estate tax is a federal excise tax imposed on property
transferred at death.42 The tax is calculated based on the value of
the gross estate of the decedent, which includes the value of all
property held by the decedent on the date of death.43 The gross
estate also includes the value of any interest in property held by the
decedent at death, such as an interest in a partnership or other
closely held business.44 The value of an item of property includible
36. Id.; see also infra notes 56, 59 and accompanying text (further
explanation of minority discounts).
37. Thomson v. Thomson, 978 So. 2d 509, 514 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2008).
38. Shopf 549 So. 2d at 840.
39. Thomson, 978 So. 2d at 514.
40. See Cannon v. Bertrand, 981 So. 2d 169 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2008), rev'd, 2
So. 3d 393 (La. 2009); Thomson, 978 So. 2d 509.
41. See discussion infra Part II.C.
42. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (as amended in 1965); Adams v. United States,
218 F.3d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2000); Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d
999, 1001 (Former 5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170, 172 (5th
Cir. 1962); see also 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2006).
43. 26 U.S.C. § 2031.
44. Id. § 2033. A decedent's interest in a partnership falls into this category.
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in the gross estate for tax purposes is its fair market value at the
time of death.45
Estate tax regulations define fair market value as "the price at
which the property would change hands between a willing buyer
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or
sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."46
This hypothetical transaction is analzed from the viewpoint of a
hypothetical buyer and seller. Under this definition,
considerations that depend on the identity of the buyer or seller
cannot affect the value of the asset.48
The valuation of assets is determined by the interest that passes
from the decedent to the successors, as contrasted with the interest
held by the decedent prior to death or the interest held by the
successor after death.4 This means that valuation for estate tax
purposes reflects any change in the value of the property caused by
death.so In order to ascertain the value of the transferred property,
federal courts must determine the rights afforded the owner of the
property under state law.5 ' Stated in another manner, "state law ...
determines precisely what property is transferred." 52
Valuation discounts can reduce the value of assets included in
the gross estate, thereby reducing estate tax liability.53 Discounts
for lack of marketability are applied in recognition that closely
held business interests have few potential purchasers and, as a
result, are difficult to market.54 The illiquidity of the interest causes
a reduction in its value. A separate, but partially overlappin§
discount is recognized for minority interests in businesses.
45. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b). The executor of the estate can also choose
an alternate valuation date under 26 U.S.C. § 2032.
46. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b).
47. Id.; see also Estate ofBright, 658 F.2d at 1006; Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1
C.B. 237.
48. Adams v. United States, 218 F.3d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2000).
49. Estate ofBright, 658 F.2d at 1006; United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170,
172 (5th Cir. 1962).
50. Land, 303 F.2d at 172.
51. Adams, 218 F.3d at 386; see also Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1001;
Frazier v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1636 (2002), rev'd, 83 F. App'x 164 (9th
Cir. 2003); Estate of Chemodurow v. Comm'r, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1041 (2001).
52. Estate ofBright, 658 F.2d at 1001.
53. See id. at 1003.
54. Stephen C. Gara & Craig J. Langstraat, Property Valuation for Transfer
Taxes: Art, Science, or Arbitrary Decision?, 12 AKRON TAX J. 125, 151 (1996);
see also Estate of Bennett v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1816 (1993).
55. Gara & Langstraat, supra note 54, at 153.
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Minority discounts make "an allowance for the fact that a minority
interest in a closely held corporation or partnership does not
possess voting control and is often subject to the controlling
ownership interests."5 6 The two discounts overlap because lack of
marketability is often a characteristic of a minority interest.57
Although the discounts are frequently applied in tandem, the two
discounts are distinct." Minority discounts compensate for a lack
of control over the business, whereas discounts for lack of
marketability compensate for the market limitations on free exit
from the business.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Shopf applied the above
discounts to determine the fair market value of a withdrawing
partner's interest in a partnership. 60 However, following the
Cannon decision, it is questionable whether minority discounts and
discounts for lack of marketabilit will be used in Louisiana for
valuation of partnership interests.6
III. CANNON V. BERTRAND
A. The Louisiana Supreme Court Decision
Cannon presents facts similar to those in Shopf The plaintiff in
Cannon was the holder of a one-third share of a non-term
partnership with the two defendants.62 Similar to Shopf, the sole
asset of the partnership was a parcel of land in Mississippi used by
the three partners for the sale of timber and hunting.63 After nearly
10 years as a partner, the plaintiff sought to withdraw from the
partnership under Louisiana Civil Code article 2822. 4 When the
56. Id. at 153.
57. Id at 154.
58. Id
59. Id.
60. See discussion supra Part II.B.
61. See discussion infra Part III.
62. Cannon v. Bertrand, 2 So. 3d 393, 393-94 (La. 2009). The partnership
in Shopf was also non-term. Shopf v. Marina Del Ray P'ship, 549 So. 2d 833,
837 (La. 1989).
63. Cannon v. Bertrand, 981 So. 2d 169, 171 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2008), rev'd,
2 So. 3d 393 (La. 2009). The only asset of value in Shopf was waterfront
property. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
64. Cannon, 981 So. 2d at 171. Article 2822 states: "If a partnership has
been constituted without a term, a partner may withdraw from the partnership
without the consent of his partners at any time, provided he gives reasonable
2011] NOTE 1035
6LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
three partners could not reach an agreement on the value of the
plaintiffs share, the plaintiff brought suit for judicial
determination of value under Louisiana Civil Code article 2825.65
The appellate court upheld the trial court's application of a
minority discount to the plaintiffs one-third share in the
partnership. 66 The Cannon court found that Shopf gives courts "the
flexibility to use, at their discretion, a tool in the form of a minority
discount to make a judicial determination of the value of a
withdrawing partner's share."67 The court also noted that the main
asset of the partnership was land, similar to Shopf 8 The appellate
court upheld the trial court's determination that a minority interest
in "land is worth less than a simple mathematical one-third of the
total value of that land."69
The Louisiana Supreme Court began its analysis by referring to
Louisiana Civil Code article 2823, which states that a withdrawing
partner is entitled to the value of his share.70 The main issue in
Cannon, the court noted, was determining how to calculate the
value of a partner's minority interest in a non-term partnership.7 '
The court distinguished Cannon from its prior decision in
Shopf and stated that the discount applied in Shopf did not apply to
the present case. 72 The determination that Shopf was not binding
precedent to the Cannon case is based primarily on the conclusion
that the Shopf decision ascertained fair market value of a minority
interest by discounting an offer made by the holder of a majority
interest.73 This discount is described in the Cannon decision as a
"majority discount," which would not apply in Cannon because
there is no such offer by a majority shareholder.74 The court found
that Shopf application of discounts was merely dicta in the present
notice in good faith at a time that is not unfavorable to the partnership." LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 2822 (2005).
65. Cannon, 2 So. 3d at 394. Article 2825 states that a withdrawing partner
may seek judicial determination of the value of his share if there is no agreement
on the amount to be paid under articles 2823 and 2824. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2825.
66. Cannon, 981 So. 2d at 120.
67. Id. at 173.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Cannon, 2 So. 3d at 394.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 396.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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case based on its determination that a true minority discount was
not applied in the decision. Further, the court determined that
Shopf did not establish fair market value as the only means of
ascertaining the value of a partner's share under Louisiana Civil
Code article 2823.
After distinguishing Shopf the court stated that "[m]inority
discounts and other discounts, such as for lack of marketability,
may have a place in our law; however, such discounts must be
used sparingly and only when the facts support their use." 7 The
court also noted that the national trend is away from applying such
discounts. The facts of Cannon, ruled the court, did not warrant
the use of a minority discount or one for lack of marketability. 79 A
minority discount was not appropriate because of the fact that the
remaining two partners had determined that they would purchase
the withdrawing partner's share, leading the court to conclude that
a minority discount was not appropriate because there is no issue
with a third party having a lack of control.80 A discount for lack of
marketability was also inappropriate in Cannon because the
partner's interest would never be for sale to third parties. 8' Further,
the court stated that applying a discount would be tantamount to
penalizing the withdrawing partner "for doing something the law
allows him to do."82
The court recognized several methods of determining the value
of a withdrawing partner's share depending on the facts of the
case: book value, market value of the underlying assets, fair market
value of the partner's share or other means depending on the
circumstances of the case. 8 The court held that "where the
remaining partners are to be the buyers of the withdrawing
partner's share, market value of the underlying partnership assets is
the most equitable manner to value the partnership share." 84 This
holding, however, appears to overrule Shopf, the prior Supreme
Court case dealing with partner withdrawal.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id
80. Id
81. Id.
82. Id. at 397.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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B. Analysis of the Cannon Decision
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Cannon relied
heavily on distinguishing the facts of Shopf in reaching the
conclusion that a minority discount should not be applied and that
market value of the partnership's underlying assets is the proper
method for valuing the interest of a withdrawing partner.8 5
However, the relevant facts of the two cases are similar. Therefore,
the Cannon decision effectively overrules Shopf, regardless of the
efforts of the court in Cannon to distinguish the two cases.
The Shopf and Cannon cases presented the court with similar
facts. Both cases involved a partner holding a minority interest
who sought to withdraw from a partnership constituted without a
term.86 Neither partnership agreement contained a clause defining
the value of a withdrawing partner's share or providing for a
standard of valuation for determining the value of a withdrawing
partner's share.87 In both cases, the withdrawing partner could not
reach an agreement with the remaining members of the partnership
as to the value of his share and brought suit under Louisiana Civil
Code article 2825 seeking judicial determination of the value of the
share.8 8 There are some differences between the two cases, such as
the Shopf court's use of an offer by the majority partner to
purchase the minority interest.89 However, the differences are
immaterial with respect to their effects on the valuation of the
minority partnership interests at issue in each case.
The court in Cannon referred to the discount applied in Shopf
as a "majority discount," referencing the discount applied to the
majority partner's offer in order to reach an arm's length
transaction price.90 However, the Shopf court considered multiple
factors in adjusting the majority partner's offer to find fair market
value.91 "The most significant adjustment," stated the court, "must
be made in recognition of the fact that the plaintiffs share is a
minority interest in a closely held business." 92 The minority
85. Id. at 395-96.
86. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2822 (2005).
87. See supra notes 26, 65 and accompanying text.
88. See discussion supra Part III.A.
89. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. The partnership in Shopf was
also engaged in a different line of business than the Cannon partnership, but this
is irrelevant because the business in Shopf was not developed, making the land it
held its most valuable asset. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
90. Cannon, 2 So. 3d at 396.
91. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
92. Shopf v. Marina Del Ray P'ship, 549 So. 2d 833, 840 (La. 1989).
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discount recognizes the fact that a minority interest has less value
to a third party because of relative illiquidity and lack of
marketability. 93
The "majority discount" referred to in Cannon was also
considered in the final determination of the value of the minority
partner's share in Shopf-94 This discount was necessary in Shopf
because the court's valuation analysis began with an offer by the
majority partner to purchase the minority interest, which the court
determined to be a reliable indicator of value under the facts of the
case. 95 It was not a misapplication of the minority discount, but
rather an entirely different discount. The use of the offer by the
majority partner was merely a place to begin the determination of
value. The adjustment accounted for the majority partner's
increased desire to purchase the minority share compared to an
investor in an arm's length transaction who would be less willing
to acquire a minority share. 96 Unlike Shopf, the Cannon court had
property appraisals that aided their determination of the value of
the withdrawing partner's share. 97 The court in Cannon failed to
consider that the Shopf decision combined multiple discounts, one
based on the minority interest and one in recognition of the
particular value of the share to a majority partner.98
The court in Cannon held that minority and other discounts did
not apply because fair market value is not the only method for
establishing value under Louisiana Civil Code article 2823.99
However, valuation discounts, a tool used by courts in the
determination of the price of an asset in an arm's length
transaction, 00 are not applicable when determining the market
value of the firm's underlying assets, which the Cannon decision
held as the proper valuation method in that particular case.'o0
The court pointed out that Shopf did not explicitly mandate the
use of fair market value as the standard of valuing a partnership
interest, and, therefore, the Cannon court could use a different
method of valuation without explicitly overruling the Shopf
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
95. Shopf, 549 So. 2d at 838.
96. Id. at 840.
97. Cannon v. Bertrand, 2 So. 3d 393, 394 (La. 2009).
98. See, e.g., Estate of Newhouse v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 193 (1990) (allowing
a minority discount as well as a discount for lack of marketability).
99. Cannon, 2 So. 3d 393.
100. See Shopf 549 So. 2d at 840.
101. Cannon, 2 So. 3d at 396.
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decision.102 However, the facts of Cannon and Shopf are similar
and typical of partnership withdrawal cases. 1 03 The attempt in
Cannon to limit the application of the decision to situations where
the remaining partners are the buyers of the withdrawing partner's
share has no effect because state partnership law requires the
partnership to pay the withdrawing partner the value of his share
upon withdrawal. 1 Therefore, although the court notes in Cannon
that value may be determined as book value, market value of
underlying partnership assets, fair market value, or other means,
the value of the firm's underlying assets appears to be the method
of valuation that will rule in future partner withdrawal cases. As
such, the Shopf fair market value method, which lower courts
followed prior to the Cannon decision, 05 is effectively overruled,
and "minority and marketability discounting should now be
considered the exception, not the rule, in the typical partnership-
interest valuation case."' 06
It appears the decision in Cannon not to follow the valuation
standard used by the Shopf court was based primarily on equity.
Out of the multiple methods that the court could choose to
establish the value of the withdrawing partner's share, the method
based on the value of the partnership's underlying assets was the
most equitable considering the facts of the case. The withdrawing
partner in Cannon was essentially a one-third co-owner of a parcel
of land.107 Awarding him less than one-third the value of that land
simply because it was held in a partnership would not only be
inequitable for the withdrawing partner, but it would give the
remaining partners a windfall profit at the withdrawing partner's
expense because they would be able to pay much less for the land
than it was actually worth. 0 s The court itself acknowledged that
assigning value based on a percentage of the underlying assets is
based in equity when it noted that awarding any less would be
punishing the withdrawing partner for doing what the law allows
102. Id.
103. MoRRis & HOLMES, supra note 18, § 4.11 (Supp. 2010).
104. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2824 (2005).
105. See Cannon v. Bertrand, 981 So. 2d 169 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2008), rev'd, 2
So. 3d 393 (La. 2009); Thomson v. Thomson, 978 So. 2d 509, 514 (La. Ct. App.
3d 2008).
106. MoRRis & HOLMES, supra note 18, § 4.11 (Supp. 2010).
107. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
108. See Cannon, 2 So. 3d at 397. If the three men had purchased the
property as co-owners, under Louisiana law, any of the three owners could force
partition of the property and sell his share for its full value. See LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 543 (2010).
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him to do.109 Regardless of the reason behind the change in
valuation methods, it is clear that Cannon is the new authority in
Louisiana partnership withdrawal cases. The implications of the
decision, however, will likely be seen in areas of law beyond the
valuing of withdrawing partner interests, such as in the realm of
estate tax.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CANNON FOR ESTATE TAx VALUATION OF
PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Cannon changed the policy
regarding the valuation of a minority interest in a partnership." 0 At
least in a situation where a minority partner withdraws from a
partnership constituted without a term, Louisiana courts will likely
assign the minority interest a value equal to the partner's
percentage of ownership of the partnership's underlying assets, or
a full pro rata share. Cannon adds an element of uncertainty to the
two certainties that are death and taxes.
A. The Effects of State Law on Estate Tax
In United States v. Land, the federal Fifth Circuit analyzed the
valuation of a partnership interest subject to a restrictive agreement
in order to determine the value of the gross estate."' The
agreement provided that upon withdrawal of a partner, the
remaining partners could purchase the interest with the sales price
limited to two-thirds of its value, but at death, the survivin
partners became entitled to purchase the interest at its full value.
In the event a partner died and the remaining partners did not wish
to purchase the decedent's interest, the agreement stated that the
partnership would be dissolved and its assets liquidated and
distributed according to percentage of ownership. The court
noted that the decedent's interest in the partnership before death
was irrelevant where death alters value; those provisions of the
partnership agreement restricting value had no effect. 114 Although
death does not ordinarily alter value, in this case, the partnership
agreement provided that the death of a partner would assure that
the partner's interest would be purchased at full value or receive
109. Cannon, 2 So. 3d at 396-97.
110. See discussion supra Part III.
111. 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1962).
112. Id. at 171.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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the full value through liquidation.11 5 Because the heirs of the
deceased partner were guaranteed full pro rata value, the court
found that this value controlled for estate tax purposes and applied
no discounts." 6
In Estate of Bright, the Fifth Circuit used Texas law to
determine the value of property for estate tax purposes." 7 The
decedent and her husband owned a 55% block of common stock in
a corporation as community property." 8 Upon death, she devised
her share of the stock to a trust set up for the benefit of her children
with her husband as trustee." 9 The government sought to value the
decedent's interest in the corporation as a one-half share of a 55%
control block, which would be subject to a control premium.120
Under Texas law, community property is divided equally upon
death with each spouse owning an undivided one-half interest in
community property.121 However, Texas law also provides that the
surviving spouse or the estate of the deceased spouse has the right
to demand partition of the assets, leaving divided one-half interests
held by the surviving spouse and the estate.' 22 Based on the right
of partition held by the living spouse, the court rejected the
government's contention that the proper valuation method would
be one-half of the 55% block of stock.12 3 The decedent's half of
the community shares of stock was valued as distinct property,
with a minority discount applied b' the court because the
ownership interest was less than 50%.1
In Adams v. United States, the Fifth Circuit examined the estate
tax valuation of an assignee interest in a Texas family limited
partnership.125 The decedent held a one-fourth interest in a family
partnership with three other siblings, one of whom held sole
managerial power.126 In order to value the interest, the court had to
first determine the rights of the holder of the interest under Texas
partnership law.127 The key question was whether the holder of an
115. Id. at 175.
116. Id.
117. Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (Former 5th Cir. 1981).
118. Id. at 1000.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1001.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1008.
125. 218 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2000).
126. Id. at 384.
127. Id. at 386.
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assignee interest in a Texas partnership has the right to force
liquidation or to compel the other partners to buy out the
interest. 128 The court determined that an interest that included
liquidation rights would be entitled to a full pro rata share of the
firm's value and that discounts would be inapplicable.129 However,
if the assignee's interest had no accompanying liquidation rights,
minority and lack of marketability discounts could be applied to
reduce the value of the share and, subsequently, the tax liability
associated with it.130 A hypothetical buyer would know that he
could exercise his liquidation rights and trade the interest for cash,
thereby making the problems with holding a minority assignee
interest in an ongoing partnership immaterial.13 1 The court
concluded that, although Texas law does not contain a provision
for valuing an assignee partnership interest, it explicitly gives
partners the right to compel liquidation.132 Therefore, because
assignees were not explicitly granted the same rights as partners
with regards to liquidation, the drafters did not likely intend to
grant assignees liquidation rights.'33 Because the decedent's
interest was an assignee interest with no explicit liquidation rights,
the fair market value of the interest could include discounts for the
minority status or lack of marketability.' 3 4
The above decisions evidence the ways in which contract or
state law can affect the value of business interests. The terms of the
partnership agreement in Land dictated the value of the share held
in the decedent's estate. 35 Bright and Adams show how state law
determines the value of a business interest.136 In particular, Adams
reveals how state laws controlling the liquidation rights of the
holder of an interest in a business can affect the value of that
interest.137 Because state law determines the value of assets in the
gross estate, a case interpreting and applying state law, such as
Cannon, directly affects the valuation of assets for estate tax
purposes.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 387.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 390.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 391.
135. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
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B. The Effects of Cannon on Partnership Interest Valuation
It is well settled that estate taxes are levied against the fair
market value of the assets held by the estate of the decedent.' 3 8 It is
also clear that the fair market value of certain interests depends on
the riahts afforded the owner of the interest under relevant state
law.' The rights of a partner under state law determine the value
of the partner's interest in the business.
Under Louisiana law, a partner ceases to be a member of a
partnership at his death or withdrawal.14 0 The former partner, or
the successor of a deceased partner, is entitled to an amount equal
to the value of the share held by the former partner. 14 1 Because the
Civil Code treats all types of partnership termination the same, the
method of valuing a partnership interest held by successors of a
decedent will be the same as if it belonged to a withdrawing
partner.142 Prior to Cannon, Shopf defined the value of a
withdrawing partner's interest as fair market value, which made
the interest subject to appropriate discounts for minority status or
lack of marketability.14 Viewed from the estate tax hypothetical-
buyer standard, a willing buyer of the interest would pay no more
than an amount that a Louisiana court would determine as the
value of the interest. For estate tax purposes, any discount that a
Louisiana court applies to a partnership interest upon withdrawal
of the partner, such as a minority or lack of marketability discount,
applies in valuation of the interest for estate tax purposes.
The Cannon court stated that fair market value was not an
equitable valuation method for a withdrawing partner's interest in
a partnership, at least under the circumstances of the case.144 A
more appropriate method, held the court, is a percentage of the
market value of the underlying partnership assets.14 5 Under this
approach, a 30% share in a partnership with net assets worth
$100,000 would be valued at $30,000, undiscounted. Because
Cannon presented a factual situation common to most partnership
withdrawal cases, the method of valuation applied in the decision
138. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
139. See discussion supra Part IV.B; supra notes 51-52 and accompanying
text.
140. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2818 (2005).
141. Id. art. 2823.
142. See id.
143. Shopf v. Marina Del Ray P'ship, 529 So. 2d 833, 839 (La. 1989).
144. Cannon v. Bertrand, 2 So. 3d 393, 396 (La. 2009).
145. Id. at 397.
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will likely control the majority of future partnership withdrawal
cases. 146
If Cannon valuation is controlling in cases where a partner
withdraws from the partnership, it will also apply in situations
where a former partner's interest is valued after his death.147 A
partner's death causes a cessation of his membership in the
partnership.148 The successors of the deceased partner, therefore,
are not entitled to the decedent's former interest in the partnership
because the interest ceases to exist upon the partner's death.
Instead, the successors are entitled to an amount equal to the value
of the decedent's interest in the partnership.149 This amount is
equivalent to the amount that the decedent would have been
entitled to had he withdrawn from the partnership prior to death.'50
Cannon valuation is applicable in valuing a deceased partner's
former interest in a partnership, and the successors of the decedent
can receive a pro rata share of the partnership's underlying assets.
Because valuation for estate tax purposes is the fair market
value of the interest that passes, the value of the interest received
by the successors must be ascertained.1 5 1 In Louisiana, where
membership in the partnership terminates upon death, the interest
that passes is the right to receive an amount equal to the value of
the share held by the decedent prior to death.152 The valuation
method applied in Cannon, market value of the partnership's
underlying assets, determines the value of the transferred interest.
Based on this valuation, under the estate tax fair market value
standard, a hypothetical buyer could purchase the successors'
interest in a family limited partnership and be entitled to receive a
pro rata share of the partnership's assets under Cannon. The
hypothetical buyer would be willing to purchase the successors'
rights for an amount equal to the decedent's pro rata share of the
firm's underlying assets, with no minority or lack of marketability
discounts, making this the controlling value for estate tax purposes.
146. Cases on the valuation of former partnership interests generally only
arise in the same context as Cannon: a non-term partnership with no stated value
in the partnership agreement. Partners in term partnerships do not enjoy the
same withdrawal rights, and Louisiana Civil Code article 2823 does not apply
where the partnership agreement dictates value upon withdrawal. If a case arises
under one of these scenarios, the applicability of Cannon is uncertain.
147. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
148. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2818 (2005).
149. Id. art. 2823.
150. Id.
151. See supra Part II.C.
152. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2823.
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Although minority and lack of marketability discounts will not
likely be applied in partnership withdrawal situations post-Cannon,
the court did not eliminate all possibilities of their application or
the application of other discounts. 153 At least for estate tax
consideration, the decedent's interest in a partnership, although
theoretically worth its full pro rata share, will likely be subject to
some discounting. Under the willing buyer standard, a purchaser of
the interest would be entitled to receive the decedent's full share of
the partnership's assets. However, the remaining partners are
unlikely to agree to pay this value simply upon the demand of the
buyer of the share because the partnership would not likely have
enough liquid assets on hand to simply pay the value of the former
partner's share. In order to cover the share, the partners would
either be forced to liquidate partnership assets or incur new
liabilities.
The most probable result is that the holder of the former
partner's interest in the above situation would sue under Louisiana
Civil Code article 2825 to receive the value of the share if the
partnership agreement does not provide for a valuation method
upon withdrawal. An example of such a situation is the Cannon
case itself. The three partners in Cannon could not reach an
agreement on the value of the withdrawing partner's share.' 54 Had
an agreement been reached that required the partners to pay the
withdrawn partner for his share, they would have likely been
forced to either sell a portion of the land, the partnership's only
asset; take a mortgage on the land; or pay out of their own pockets.
With these options, a lawsuit is clearly the most probable result in
the case of a withdrawn or deceased partner.
Under the estate tax standard, the hypothetical buyer of the
deceased partner's interest would have knowledge of this situation
and would be unwilling to pay full value for an amount that he
could only receive through a lawsuit. The time delay and expense
associated with impending litigation would force a discount on the
value of decedent's former partnership interest. In effect, a
litigation discount takes the place of the minority and lack of
marketability discounts that are no longer applicable. However,
this discount is likely to be substantially lower than the discounts
applied for lack of marketability and minority status.
153. Cannon v. Bertrand, 2 So. 3d 393, 396 (La. 2009). By refusing to strike
the use of discounts entirely, the court leaves the door open for the potential
application of discounts if a situation warrants their use. It is uncertain whether
Cannon or discounts will apply to inter vivos transfers of partnership interests.
154. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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The Cannon decision will increase the value of partnership
interests held by deceased partners for estate tax purposes in many
circumstances. The method of valuation applied in Cannon makes
those interests more valuable to their owner and therefore more
valuable for estate tax purposes because the discounts applied for
minority status and lack of marketability will no longer be
applicable. Even after applying a discount due to the likelihood of
future litigation, Louisiana partnership interests will likely be more
valuable for estate tax purposes post-Cannon.
V. PRACTICAL ESTATE PLANNING AFTER THE CANNON DECISION
The change in valuation of partnership interests following
Cannon is likely to have an effect on the use of family limited
partnerships for estate planning purposes. Although the extent to
which Cannon will affect estate tax valuation is unknown, the
likely result is that the Cannon decision has at least some negative
impact on the use of limited partnerships for estate planning. The
limited liability company is a better alternative to the family
limited partnership because it avoids the negative implications of
the Cannon decision on estate tax valuation.
A. The Effect of Cannon on the Use of Family Limited Partnerships
for Estate Planning
Family limited partnerships are widely used to hold family
assets for estate planning purposes.' 55 These partnerships allow for
the reduction of estate tax liability through the use of valuation
discounts, such as minority and lack of marketability discounts.'56
These valuation discounts are not only useful for decreasing the
value of assets for estate tax purposes, they also allow for
increased inter vivos transfers under the annual gift tax
exclusion. 5 7 The family limited partnership is also attractive for
estate tax planning because it allows the parents to retain control of
155. Rebecca B. Hawblitzel, Note, A Change in Planning: Estate of Strangi
v. Commissioner's Effect on the Use of Family Limited Partnerships in Estate
Planning, 57 ARK. L. REV. 595, 602 (2004).
156. Standaland, supra note 1, at 685-86.
157. See MEZZULLO, supra note 2, pt. I.C. A 15% interest in a business
valued at $100,000 could potentially be transferred because discounts for
minority status and lack of marketability may reduce the value of the interest to
an amount less than the $10,000 maximum annual gift tax exclusion.
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the partnership through ownership of the general partnership
interests. 158
In a typical family limited partnership, parent members
contribute assets in exchange for general and limited partnership
interests.159 Parent members then generally make annual gifts of
limited partnership interests to their children with a value that falls
under the amount excludable from the gift tax.16 0 These transfers
are subject to valuation discounts, giving transferors the ability to
transfer interests in the partnership with a higher pro rata value
than fair market value. I If a partnership's net asset value is
$150,000, a transferor could potentially transfer 10% of the
ownership interests because discounting would allow the value for
gift tax purposes to be reduced to an amount that falls under the
annual $13,000 exclusion amount.162 These inter vivos transfers of
partnership interests reduce the value of the parent members' estate
for taxation purposes.
However, Cannon makes the use of a family limited
partnership a less attractive option for estate tax planning because
the ownership interest retained by the parent will likely not be
discounted. 16 Any remaining interest that has not been transferred
from the estate of the decedent would be the equivalent of the
interest held by the plaintiff in Cannon, which is the right to
receive the value of the former partner's share under Louisiana
Civil Code article 2823.'6 Based on Cannon, the holders of the
limited partnership interest would be entitled to receive a pro rata
share of the underlying assets of the firm.16 5 The classification of
the interests held by the decedent as either general or limited
partnership interests would be irrelevant because a limited partner
is entitled to the same value upon withdrawal or death as a general
partner.'6 6
158. Standaland, supra note 1, at 684-85.
159. Id.
160. MEZZULLO, supra note 2. Gifts of up to $13,000 (as adjusted for
inflation) are excluded from the total amount of gifts made during the calendar
year. See 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b) (2006). Spouses can combine gift exclusions,
doubling the excluded amount. See id. § 2513.
161. MEZZULLO, supra note 2.
162. 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b).
163. See discussion supra Part III.A.
164. See discussion supra Part III.A.
165. Louisiana Civil Code article 2818 does not distinguish between a
withdrawing and a deceased partner. See discussion supra Part III.A.
166. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2836 (2005).
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The change in the method of valuing partnership interests
under the Cannon decision will lead to increased values for
partnership interests formerly held by withdrawn or deceased
partners. Although the extent to which the Cannon decision will
apply is uncertain, the possibility of higher values placed on
former partnership interests for estate tax purposes makes the
family limited partnership a less attractive option for estate
planning.
B. The Use ofLimited Liability Companies for Estate Planning
The effects of Cannon on the taxation of partnership interests
make the limited liability company a more attractive option for
estate planning. The default rules under Louisiana LLC law create
the opportunity for estate planners to utilize discounts to reduce the
value of transferred assets in the estate.167 Through the use of an
LLC, the effects of Cannon on partnership valuation can be
avoided for estate tax purposes.
A basic family LLC under Louisiana law would be an LLC
constituted for a term with a parent or parents as the sole
members.168 As the sole members, the parents would be equal
managers of the LLC and possess financial rights in the company. 169
Alternatively, the articles of organization can designate one person
as the manager of the LLC, leaving remaining members with limited
voting rights.170 The members could subsequently utilize the annual
gift exclusion by transferring interests in the LLC to their children or
other family members. The transferred interests would likely be
subject to valuation discounts, such as discounts for lack of control
and marketability, allowing the transferor to transfer more property
from the estate under the annual gift exclusion.17 1
The parent members of the LLC can transfer either full
membership interests or assignee interests.1 72 A holder of an
assignee interest has no managerial rights in the company and is
167. SUSAN KALINKA, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND PARTNERSHIPS: A
GUIDE TO BUSINESS AND TAX PLANNING § 3.27, in 9 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 378 (3d ed. 2001).
168. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1325 (2010). By constituting the LLC for
a term, the ability of the members to withdraw is restricted, limiting the value of
the interests held by the members. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
169. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1301 (Supp. 2011).
170. Id. § 1312 (2010). See generally KALINKA,supra note 167, § 1.38, at 101.
171. See KALINKA, supra note 167, § 3.27, at 381.
172. See id § 3.31, at 409.
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entitled only to the financial rights of a member.' 7 3 Assignee
interests are worth less than membership interests under the estate
tax willing buyer standard because a buyer would pay less for an
interest with no control over the business.' 74 However, the
transferred interest may still be included in the estate of the
transferor under Internal Revenue Code section 2036(a) because
the transferor would retain the ri ht to designate the persons who
receive income from the LLC. 5 This can be avoided if the
members consent to admission of the assignee as a member, giving
the transferee managerial rights in the LLC.17 6 The transferor with
a managing interest could still retain actual control over the
distribution policy of the company as long as 7 7any transfers of
interest in the LLC are nonmanaging interests.' The transferred
interest would still be subject to valuation discounts because of the
prohibition against the transferring of managerial rights in the LLC
without unanimous consent of the members under the default LLC
rules.' 78
The true advantage that an LLC has over a partnership for
estate tax planning purposes after Cannon is the valuation of the
interest in the estate of a deceased member. The difference
between partnership and LLC law is important to note here. LLC
law, unlike partnership law, treats withdrawal and death
differently.179 Under Louisiana LLC law, the death of an individual
member causes his membership to cease, and the member's
executor is treated as an assignee of the member's former interest
in the company.'so An assignee does not have the right to withdraw
from the LLC and receive a payment for his interest because this is
a right reserved for members.' 8 ' Partnership law, on the other
173. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1330 (2010).
174. See KALINKA, supra note 167, § 3.31, at 409.
175. 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a) (2006).
176. See KALINKA, supra note 167, § 3.31, at 409.
177. Id
178. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1330; see KALINKA, supra note 167, § 1.38,
at 101.
179. Compare LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1325(C) (a withdrawing member is
entitled to the fair market value of his interest), and id § 1333 (a member's
membership ceases at death and his legal representative is treated as an assignee of
his interest), with LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2823 (2005) (a withdrawing partner, or
his successors if he is deceased, is entitled to the value of his former share).
180. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1333.
181. See id. § 1330 (an assignee has no rights as a member until he is
admitted as a member); see also id § 1325(C) (stating that a member in a
partnership may withdraw).
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hand, entitles the successors of a deceased partner to the same
value as a withdrawing partner.182 Even if the operating agreement
allowed an assignee of an LLC interest to withdraw, unlike the
Louisiana Civil Code article that says a withdrawing partner is
entitled to the value of his share, LLC law provides that a
withdrawing member is entitled to the fair market value of the
interest.183 The Cannon decision is unlikely to have an effect on
LLC interest valuation.
The default LLC laws provide that a holder of an assigned
interest, which would be held by the legal representative of a
deceased member, cannot become a member of the LLC without
the unanimous written consent of all members.' 84 A discount for
lack of control could be applied to the assignee interest.'8 ' Further,
the assignee interest may not enjoy liquidation rights, even if the
company were not constituted for a term, because only members
hold liquidation rights.186 The lack of liquidation rights associated
with the interest would make the interest less attractive to a
hypothetical buyer, further reducing its value for estate tax
purposes. There may also be no market for such an interest,
meaning a discount for a lack of marketability may also be
available in valuing the interest for estate tax purposes.187 The
availability of multiple discounts in the valuation of the interest of
a deceased member of a limited liability company makes the LLC
a better option than a family limited partnership for estate tax
purposes because such discounts may no longer be available in
valuing the interests of a former partner after Cannon.
VI. CONCLUSION
Following Cannon, Louisiana courts will likely no longer
apply valuation discounts in valuing partnership interests held by
withdrawing partners.' 88 The effects of Cannon are also likely to
carry over into the valuation of an interest formerly held by a
deceased partner.189 Without the availability of discounts for
182. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2823. The Cannon decision determined this
value as the value of the underlying business assets. See supra note 84 and
accompanying text.
183. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1325(C).
184. Id. § 1332(A)(1).
185. See generally KALINKA, supra note 167, § 3.27, at 381.
186. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1330; id. § 1325.
187. KALINKA, supra note 167, § 3.27, at 381.
188. See discussion supra Part III.B.
189. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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minority interests, lack of marketability, and others, the interests of
former partners upon death will be more valuable for estate tax
purposes.190 The increased value of a deceased partner's interests
will increase the estate tax burden on the decedent's estate.191 Due
to the likelihood of higher estate taxes levied on partnership
interests post-Cannon, the family limited partnership is a less
attractive option for managing family assets in an estate tax
plan. 192 A more effective option is the limited liability company. 193
Louisiana default rules regarding the transfer of an interest in a
limited liability company allow opportunities for discounting that
the Cannon decision effectively eliminates for family limited
partnerships.194 Estate planners should consider using limited
liability companies in creating estate plans in lieu of the family
limited partnership. Further, family limited partnerships currently
in use as a part of an estate plan should be converted to limited
liability companies to make the most effective utilization of
valuation discounts. With death and taxes being the only things
certain in life, the use of a limited liability company instead of a
family limited partnership for estate planning will alleviate the
uncertainty that surrounds the taxes that accompany death.
Jonathan J. Rose
190. See discussion supra Part V.
191. See discussion supra Part V.
192. See discussion supra Part V.A.
193. See discussion supra Part V.B.
194. See discussion supra Part V.B.
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